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13 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Recommendations of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, January 20, 1962

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board submitted to him on January 20, 1962 a series of recommendations on various intelligence activities of the government. Attached for your information and action are those excerpts from the report and recommendations of the President's Board that apply to the DD/I area. Would you submit by 1 March 1962 your comments and an indication of the action which you plan to take or have taken.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

Attachments

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-Excerpts -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


During the period from November 6 through 19, 1961, representatives of the Board (Mr. Gordon Gray, member, and Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary) made an on-the-scene review of United States foreign intelligence activities

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The results of the review have been made the subject of a detailed report. The Board was given the highlights of this report at its meeting on December 9, 1961, and thereafter Board members were afforded an opportunity to study it further. (Subsequently, and at the request of General Maxwell Taylor, Messrs. Gray and Coyne met with the Special NSC 5412/2 Group and discussed matters of interest and concern to that Group

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We consider that the detailed report which was made available to us upon completion of the review provides a most useful basis for an appraisal of some of the strengths and weaknesses of the United States foreign intelligence effort in the countries involved. Except for such on-the-scene reviews, no other mechanism is employed by our Government to obtain a comprehensive and objective view of the over-all activities being carried out by the several U.S. intelligence elements in a given country, in pursuance of their respective and varying assignments. (In a few instances where the visited U.S. officials identified and requested attention to substantive problems falling outside the Board's responsibilities, we have seen to it that appropriate officials in Washington were made cognizant.)

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[REDACTED]

The review has reminded us of the extreme importance we must attach to our varied intelligence collection efforts in the countries concerned, [REDACTED] us strategic locations and facilities vital not only to our requirements but also irreplaceable elsewhere in the world. A neutralist or anti-United States development in the governments of these two countries could present a crippling blow to our intelligence undertakings.

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We note with approval that in certain instances the responsible United States intelligence agencies involved have undertaken consideration or appropriate action with respect to some of the foreign intelligence problems which were identified in the course of the reviews made by the Board's representatives. Accordingly, in those instances, and possibly in others, some of our recommendations have have been overtaken by events transpiring subsequent to the review by the Board's representatives.

Based on our consideration of the review and report, we submit the following recommendations which deal with those subjects falling within the category of the foreign intelligence effort in general, and those falling within the category of subjects which are applicable to our intelligence activities in the particular countries involved.


GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

In recognition of the continuing importance of an improved intelligence potential and product on the part of the United States intelligence community at large, we recommend that:

1. As a means toward achieving increased effectiveness in the collection, reporting, communication, and integrated assessment of political intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence (consulting in appropriate instances with the U.S. intelligence agencies concerned) initiate action to ensure that (a) when circumstances permit, U.S. Ambassadors be provided an opportunity to comment upon the drafts of proposed national and special intelligence estimates involving

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countries to which they are accredited or which are geographically or politically related to their countries of assignment, (b) the Political Sections of our Embassies, and the Ambassadors in appropriate instances, be given an opportunity to comment upon all political intelligence at the time it is being furnished to Headquarters, except under circumstances in which such action would impose undue delay on the reporting process, (c) our Ambassadors

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use may be made of their language capabilities, and (e) when significant intelligence is reported which subsequently proves to be erroneous, procedures be established for appropriate notification to the recipients of the erroneous information.

2. ...


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
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

With a view to obtaining solutions to problems which were identified as being specifically related to the United States intelligence effort in the particular countries reviewed, we recommend that:

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2. ...


3. With respect to



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a. ...

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
c. ...

4. ...


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


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7. With respect to



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b. ...

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FOR THE BOARD

/s/


James R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board

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


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